Individual municipal political machines such as Tammany Hall in New York were not dismantled completely until the middle of the 20th century. The American experience highlights a number of features of both corruption and the reform of corrupt systems.
First, the incentives that led to the creation of the clientelistic system were deeply political. Politicians got into office via their ability to distribute patronage; they had no incentive to vote in favour of something like the Pendleton Act that would take away those privileges. The only reason it passed was a tragic exogenous event — the Garfield assassination — which mobilised public opinion in favour of a more modern governmental system.
Second, reform of the system was similarly political. The Progressive Era saw the emergence of a vast reform coalition made up of business leaders, urban reformers, farmers and ordinary citizens who were fed up with the existing patronage system.
It also required a clear reform agenda pointing towards modern government, formulated by intellectuals such as Frank Goodnow, Dorman Eaton and Woodrow Wilson. Finally, reform was helped along by economic development. Industrialisation in the US produced new social groups such as business leaders who needed efficient government services, a broad and better-educated middle class who could mobilise for reform, and a grassroots organisation of civil society groups.
The American experience is suggestive of how progress in the fight against corruption may be waged in contemporary societies suffering from it. Reform is always a political matter that will require formation of a broad coalition of groups opposed to an existing system of corrupt politicians. Grassroots activism in favour of reform may emerge spontaneously, but such sentiments will not be translated into real change until it receives good leadership and organisation.
Reform also has a socio-economic basis: America points to another feature of anti-corruption efforts. Control of corruption was very much bound up with efforts to increase state capacity. The period that saw the emergence of an industrial economy was also characterised by huge increases in levels of education — particularly higher education, which produced an entirely new class of professionals who worked for both private businesses and the government. One of the first government agencies to be modernised in the late 19th century was the US Department of Agriculture, which benefited from a generation of professional agronomists trained in the numerous land-grant universities that sprang up around the United States.
The latter, in turn, were the product of the far-sighted Morrill Act of that sought to increase agricultural productivity among other things through higher education. It would not have been possible to reform the old patronage-based bureaucracy without access to the human capital represented by this entire generation of university- educated officials. Every important reform effort undertaken to create modern state bureaucracies — in Germany, Britain, France, Japan and elsewhere — was accompanied by parallel efforts to modernise the higher education system in ways that would benefit public administration.
Today development finance institutions focus on helping to provide universal primary and secondary education to poor countries and have largely given up on supporting elite education. The reasons for this are understandable, but do not correspond to the historical experience of state modernisation in countries that became rich in earlier eras.
These general observations about historical efforts to build modern uncorrupt administrations suggest that the process will be an extended one, characterised by prolonged political struggle.
Fortunately, having a modern bureaucracy is not a sine qua non of economic development. No existing rich country had a squeaky-clean government in its early stages of economic growth — neither Britain, nor the United States in the 19th century, nor China today.
Corruption and weak governance are obstacles to economic growth, but economic growth can happen also in poorly governed societies and will produce, over time, social conditions and resources that will make government reform more feasible. But it is also a realistic assessment derived from the historical record. Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society.
The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia. World Development, 37 3 , pp.
Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation: More recently, he is the author of Political Order and Political Decay: Corruption does not happen everywhere, it is concentrated in pockets: Among industries, natural resource extraction and construction have long been seen as exceptionally prone to corruption. This is partly because projects in these sectors are idiosyncratic and difficult to scrutinise. Places where grand corruption is perceived to be flourishing are rare, but Afghanistan and Angola are examples of these extreme conditions.
As to periods, Britain in the 18th century exemplified the behaviours that would now lead to a miserable ranking in corruption indices. More pertinently, there is good reason to think that, globally, there has been an upsurge in corruption in recent decades.
Reversing this upsurge calls for concerted effort. Alongside these pockets of high corruption, other industries, other societies and other times are virtually corruption-free. Denmark is currently seen as the least corrupt place in the world and many non-Western countries such as Botswana are also viewed as relatively untainted Transparency International In most societies, corruption is not normal: Corruption is concentrated in pockets because it depends upon common expectations of behaviour.
Where corruption is the norm, getting rid of it poses a co-ordination problem: Because of this, pockets of corruption have proved to be highly persistent: Similarly, honesty is persistent. In the first TI survey conducted in , Denmark was rated second globally. This persistence is not a matter of chance.
Danes are born into an honest society and so inherit the expectation that they themselves will be trustworthy. Being trusted is a valuable asset: In consequence, individual Danes have a strong incentive not to squander this valuable asset through behaving opportunistically. Because people have rationally chosen to protect their reputation for honesty, the entire society has stayed honest. But change is possible. Until well into the 19th century, the British public sector was very corrupt.
Positions were bought and sold and contracts were awarded in return for bribes. Crises such as military humiliation in the Crimean War helped to shock governments into change. Opportunities for corruption were curtailed: A new purposive ethic was promoted and serving the nation became the pinnacle of social prestige and self-worth. By the late 19th century, the British Civil Service had become honest and competent.
This transformation was largely fortuitous rather than the result of a properly thought-through strategy. But its success reveals the key components of how change can be brought about. Societies do not have to wait for military humiliation and a moral revival: In Britain, two key things — closing off the major opportunities for corruption and making working for the public good more prestigious and satisfying than abusing office for private gain — happened together.
These two approaches are jointly critical in breaking cultures of corruption. Just as 19th-century Britain implemented both of them without international help, there is much that societies currently beset by corruption can do for themselves. However, the globalisation of business and social networks has created an important role for international action.
Countries such as Britain can contribute to encouraging both internal and international initiatives. There is enormous scope for international actions that close off opportunities for corruption. Equally, there is much that can be done to make behaviours that promote the public good more prestigious and satisfying than those that sacrifice the public interest for private gain.
This is because corruption, like honesty, tends to persist. Corrupt behaviour is self-reinforcing, and breaking out of it is not easy. A co-ordinated push for international action thus makes national initiatives more likely to succeed and more worthwhile to attempt.
It can help those societies that are still struggling with the problems that Britain faced in the 19th century. Britain has already done much to make global corruption more difficult. The Government has led the way in dismantling this labyrinth of deceit: Britain has rapidly changed from being part of the problem to being a pioneer of the solution, but quite evidently following the money is subject to a weakest-link problem.
Corrupt money will hide wherever it can, so it is vital that all the major legal and financial centres close the loopholes. There is scope to extend transparency beyond bank deposits to other major assets such as property. There is also considerable scope for those governments that adopt effective measures for following the money to require all companies that wish to do business with them to comply with these standards, providing global reach for national efforts.
A second contribution has been to increase transparency in key sectors. In North America and Europe, what began as voluntary revenue transparency is now evolving into a legal requirement. Meanwhile the EITI is becoming the established international standard-setting entity for the sector, extending voluntarism beyond simple revenue reporting to matters such as contracts.
There is now an equivalent voluntary initiative for the construction sector and it warrants similar co-ordinated propulsion. A third contribution has been to increase accountability: Clamping down on bribery is a classic instance of the free-rider problem: The alternative to such co-operation is a race to the bottom that the businesses of no decently governed country can win. There is, equally, plenty of scope for contributing to the complementary approach of making public good more prestigious and satisfying than the private gains generated by abuse of office.
Take, for example, tax administration, which is fundamental to effective government. In many poor countries, tax administration is an epicentre of corruption. As a specific example, consider the administration of Value-Added Tax VAT , which is a means of revenue-raising encouraged globally by the International Monetary Fund IMF because it is less distorting than most other taxes. Even before VAT, many tax inspectors were corrupt, using their power to tax firms as a means of extorting money for themselves: VAT has reduced revenue, because it expanded the options available to corrupt tax officials.
It works by firms initially paying tax on their gross sales, but then getting a rebate on the inputs they have purchased, so that they end up only paying tax on the value they have added to those inputs.
But in a country that introduces a VAT, a corrupt tax official can now sell a firm phoney tax receipts on inputs, in addition to the standard extortion racket. As a result, the rebate system ends up paying out more than the sales tax component of VAT is paying in. Clearly at the core of this phenomenon are norms of behaviour among tax officials, such that seizing opportunities for private gain is seen as both more prestigious and more satisfying than contributing to the public good of generating tax revenue and the public services it can finance.
How might Britain, and other countries in which VAT collection does not face such problems, help to change this perception? Social prestige and personal satisfaction are largely set within peer groups: Hence a practical way of changing the behaviour of corrupt officials is to alter the group of people they regard as their peers.
Currently, a corrupt tax official is likely to have two key networks in which they seek prestige: Their family will honour them for helping relatives who lack opportunities to earn a large income: Their fellow tax inspectors, subject to the same family pressures, may see corruption as reasonable.
They may even regard honest behaviour as a threat to their own conduct and therefore disloyal. A useful way of changing this state of affairs is to twin those tax administrations in which corruption is endemic with administrations in countries that are not corrupt.
Twinning could involve regular secondments of staff in both directions and the potential for accreditation to international professional associations at various ranks. The purpose would not primarily be a transfer of technical skills, although that could clearly be a component, but rather a gradual transfer of attitudes and behaviours.
The new network exposes the official to the potential of a new identity as a member of a prestigious international peer group of modern tax officials, working to global, not local, standards. It exposes the official to a new narrative circulating in the network: Exposure to these new attitudes creates a tension between the behaviour that would generate prestige and self-worth in the old networks and the behaviour that would generate prestige and self-worth in the new network.
Creating this tension is not the end of the story, but it is an essential step. The other key step is to tackle the co-ordination problem: For example, many governments have closed corrupt tax departments within their ministries of finance and replaced them with independent revenue authorities, a change that has usually been reasonably successful. An analogous way for international twinning to overcome the co-ordination problem is for all the staff in an entire unit to be exposed to the international network at the same time.
Each official in the unit would then realise that their colleagues were facing the same tension between old and new networks and hence the same choice. There are already a few examples of institutional twinning. Also, until a decade ago, governors of the Bank of England used to host an annual meeting for governors of African central banks. But the scope for twinning is vast, relative to what is, as yet, happening both in governments and in the wider society. Around the world, governments have similar structures.
For example, virtually all governments in low-income countries have a ministry of transport, a ministry of health and a ministry of finance. OECD governments have been liaising with these ministries for half a century, but the entities that are linked to them are their aid agencies not their counterpart ministries. Direct links with counterpart ministries have the potential for a very different form of relationship based on peer-group networks, rather than on money with conditions.
An important example is the regulation of utilities such as electricity. Many governments of low-income countries are now establishing regulatory agencies, which is a vital step in attracting private finance for infrastructure.
But the regulation of utilities faces intense pressures for corruption: In the OECD, regulatory agencies have been operating for two or three decades. The OECD has also built peer group networks that have evolved peer standards of independence, transparency and impartiality.
New regulatory agencies would benefit from becoming part of this distinctive culture. Such specialised inter-government peer groups are indeed the core activity of the OECD. But membership of the OECD is confined to the governments of high-income countries.
This is designed to embed tax inspectors for OECD governments in the tax authorities of poor countries on secondment for several months: An obvious extension would be to make this a two-way exchange of staff. More seriously, while the OECD initiative is excellent it is a drop in the ocean.
The restricted membership of the OECD limits its scope to forge global links and there is no other international institution with the remit to build peer- group links across government departments between rich countries and poor ones. Perhaps this role should become a core function of national aid agencies such as DFID, but it would benefit from a co-ordinated kick-start by several heads of government.
Twinning has the potential to be extended well beyond government: Again, historically such links have largely been confined to development non-governmental organisations NGOs such as Oxfam, which channel donations to needs. But an important part of tackling corruption is resetting the cultures of professions, including accountancy, law, medicine and teaching. For example, in many poor countries, it is socially acceptable for teachers not to show up for lessons.
Twinning involving things like teacher exchanges between schools could help to shift these dysfunctional values. The global explosion of social media has made this far more feasible.
The two approaches of closing off opportunities for corruption and reducing the prestige and satisfaction generated by corrupt behaviour reinforce each other. As the difficulties and risks of corrupt behaviour rise, fewer people will behave corruptly. This directly reduces the esteem from being corrupt because it is no longer so normal.
Similarly, as more people start to get their esteem from being honest, those who remain corrupt are easier to spot and so find themselves running bigger risks. National actions against corruption complement international actions. One major way of squeezing out corruption is to remove obvious sources of rent-seeking such as rationed access to foreign exchange and the award of government contracts through secret negotiation rather than open bidding. Competition within rule-based markets is an important part of the system of checks and balances that constrain public officials from the abuse of office.
Another is to prosecute some prominent senior officials. For example, in Ghana, 20 judges were sacked in late for accepting bribes based on video evidence gathered by an investigative journalist BBC News Being based on independent evidence, such sackings cannot be misinterpreted as government attempts to crush political opposition.
Further, as high-profile events, they generate common knowledge among officials that all other officials are reflecting on whether they should change their behaviour.
Not all corruption is directly financial. Electoral corruption is highly damaging. New research finds that, under normal conditions, governments that deliver good economic performance enhance their prospects of retaining office, but that the discipline of accountability breaks down when elections are not free and fair Collier and Hoeffler Twinning national electoral commissions with their international peers, along with twinning local and international election monitors, can help to raise standards of electoral conduct.
An international initiative against corruption provides an opportunity for national actions and international actions to cohere. As people recognise that the calculus of risks and rewards and the sources of prestige and satisfaction are changing both for themselves and their colleagues, previously entrenched patterns of behaviour could become unstable. Mass shifts in cultures of corruption do happen and it is possible to make them happen.
His latest book is Exodus: Someone who is corrupt is described as being bobolu and people have deep disdain for such a person. In most of Africa though, there are few similar words of such powerful home-grown cultural resonance.
The idea of stealing communal goods was literally taboo. Generosity of heart, even to strangers, but especially to relatives no matter how distant , is a quality much admired by Africans generally.
And in 18 of the 28 countries, the feeling was that their governments were doing badly in the fight against corruption. The report said that, despite these disappointing findings, the bright spots across the continent were in Botswana, Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Senegal.
Citizens in these countries were some of the most positive in the region when discussing corruption Transparency International and Afrobarometer In environments where corruption is systemic but lacks cultural resonance, creating a climate where social sanction can be applied against corrupt practices has been challenging. The task therefore is two-fold: The war against graft political corruption has reached the point where the shame and social sanctions directed against this kind of theft and thief need to be given greater prominence in the arsenal used to fight corruption.
This applies especially in developing countries where its consequences can be — and often are — deadly. As such, the whole approach to corruption needs to be re-examined: Integral to this are the principles of legal authority and equality before the law.
The equality component is essential: The following complementary but separate factors in a society are critical: Each derives its legitimacy from history and the traditional ways in which meaning is made.
By their very nature, they are far more negotiable — existing as they do in a constant state of flux in a dynamic world. Our success depends on how effectively we bring and use them together in the fight against corruption.
We do this cognisant of the fact that grand corruption, when compared to the drug trade, human trafficking, terrorism finance and other global evils, is the most easily rationalisable major felonious activity on the planet. During the years to , corruption was at the centre of the global development agenda.
In , Transparency International was founded. In the mid-to-late s, corruption was adopted as a key development issue by the multilateral and bilateral development institutions. The following decade saw the rise of the BRIC nations2 and rapid economic growth across much of the developing world, as well as globalisation and its associated technologies assisting the expansion of trade and commerce.
At the same time, the struggle against Islamic extremism captured the attention of policy makers in the international community. Alongside it, unfortunately, has also come a rapid growth in the scale and complexity of corruption.
So much so, that anti-corruption work needs to be returned urgently to the heart of the global development agenda.
It needs to be part of the DNA of modern nation-states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations NGOs and even religious organisations and how they interact on the global stage. This urgency comes from the fact that graft has served to hollow out key governance institutions in some countries. This includes the defence and security sector and areas of social policy such as health and education, with dire consequences for the public services they are supposed to offer the poor, in particular.
The crippling impact of corruption on the delivery of these essential services has deepened economic inequalities, undermining faith in political processes, parties and politicians. In turn, this increases political volatility as politicians retreat to identity and personality politics with its complex web of non-negotiable irrationalities. It also feeds fundamentalism of all kinds — for example, ethnic, religious and sectarian. This also does serious damage to the independence, legitimacy and integrity of the service sector — in particular, banks, law firms and auditing firms — and deepens the challenges corruption poses.
The growth of the latter has been buoyed by the dramatic expansion and sophistication of the internet and an increasing variety of communication platforms. Although it can involve an individual or group of individuals, this sector forms itself into sophisticated entities. As I pointed out previously, businesses find corruption the easiest felonious activity to rationalise, especially in cross-cultural contexts. For them, relationships are tradable products that can be leveraged for a profit and not a social currency that helps make trade and commerce flow more smoothly within the law.
So how do we fight these piratical shadows? Corruption is defined as the abuse of vested authority for private gain. Leading global advocacy organisations such as ONE have even made efforts to quantify the cost of graft in lives McNair et al.
As the recent FIFA scandal has demonstrated, unconstrained corruption also threatens valued cultural institutions and traditions that we all hold dear. This means we are at a critical juncture. It calls for a renewed global partnership against corruption to match, and even exceed, the concentrated and successful advocacy that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The new push needs to identify, disrupt and delegitimise the global networks of corruption in money laundering; terrorism finance; drug, people and environmental trafficking; and other illicit activities.
This requires new global partnerships that target the information-era entities and domiciles that these networks rely on. They may be offshore tax havens or low-compliance jurisdictions where the ever-expanding raft of international regulations aimed at dealing with graft and illicit flows have limited currency.
To be fully effective, however, this reinvigoration of the rule of law must go hand in hand with action to create a cultural climate in which the corrupt — the thieves — are shamed for what they do. Indeed, effecting change in the culture and traditions — which inform what is acceptable behaviour — is perhaps even more important in societies where legal institutions based on the Western model are nascent, or where their existence is being energetically contested, as it is in important parts of the developing world.
The release by WikiLeaks of US diplomatic cables in was a controversial episode of unofficial transparency and a powerful interrupter to the global status quo regarding corruption in relations between nation-states. It revealed the corrupt practices that ruling elites are capable of to the growing youth populations of regions such as the Middle East.
The reverberations of this are still being felt. Across Latin America and in the developed world, revelations of inappropriate, corrupt and unethical behaviour by leaders — in both the private and corporate sectors — have created a level of criticism from the public that is unprecedented in some countries. Presidents have been forced to step down and others turned into lame ducks while still in office by dramatic mass expressions of discontent boosted by social media.
In this sense the change has already begun — untidily, noisily, chaotically and even bloodily — in many places. The outcome is uncertain. But, in the long term, it will be dramatically different from the status quo. In addition to institutions such as an International Anti- Corruption Court as a further step towards increasing transparency, strengthening enforcement and securing restitution, the tools of visa revocations, personalised financial sanctions and more harmonised extradition mechanisms could actually be cheaper and more effective in tackling corruption than prosecutions — which are always tortuous.
However, for these measures to enjoy legitimacy around the world, they must be applied, and be seen to apply, with equal force across the different regions of both the developed and developing world. To conclude, a successful international anti-corruption campaign requires co-operation on a global scale and specific legal measures that help transform attitudes towards corruption and the ability to prosecute the corrupt.
Although it may take longer, embedding a culture of social sanction and censure for anyone found guilty of engaging in, facilitating or condoning corrupt activity, even to the extent that those holding office lose public trust, would support these measures.
They need to be seen as bobolu. They need to feel the social stigma when they attend family gatherings, visit the golf club or step into the supermarket — as much to set an example to others as to punish the individual, impressing on the whole community that corruption will not be tolerated.
John has been involved in anti-corruption research, advisory work and activism in Kenya, Africa and the wider international community for 19 years. This includes work in civil society, media, government and the private sector. Risk Advisory Group Report: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: The Trillion Dollar Scandal Study. The Risk Advisory Group. The Compliance Horizon Survey. Corruption Perceptions Index — Lesotho.
Transparency International and Afrobarometer. Africa Survey — Global Corruption Barometer. United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December The early spring of saw thousands of angry people on the streets of Chisinau, capital of the tiny Republic of Moldova.
We believe that the citizens of Moldova were victims of a transnational web of corruption, benefiting politicians and criminals who used complex multi-layered company structures to conceal both their identities and their activities.
Regrettably, this story is not unique. The power of these crime groups stems primarily from their ability to operate with ease across national frontiers. They complete a detailed risk assessment at the country level and then choose the least vulnerable approach to conduct their illicit activities, whether in narcotics, refugee trafficking or the massive money laundering exercises that follow such crimes.
The problem for national law enforcement is that, by definition, it cannot follow this type of crime easily or quickly across borders. Data exchanges between states and law enforcement agencies take time. Modern crime schemes are designed to have very short lives to avoid detection, lasting sometimes just months before the associated companies and bank accounts are wound up and replaced by new ones.
Yet alongside the advantages available for criminals of operating on this global scale, making it inherently harder to track them down, there are also disadvantages that the clever journalist or law enforcement official can exploit to expose them. So how do we do this? How do we stop criminal gangs and the corrupt politicians they rely on — conducting business as usual?
Firstly, I will argue, through data: Secondly, by journalists using advanced investigative techniques, including the emerging discipline of data journalism, to identify the patterns and practices inherent in corrupt activity. Opaque systems allow them to thrive. And some of them go to great lengths to disguise their wrongdoing, using financial and company structures that span the world. Such criminal schemes are designed by creative and intelligent, if misguided, people.
Some of them could have been the next Steve Jobs, but found crime more appealing. For years, from the early s, Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian and many other Eastern European mobsters and politicians were using Cyprus as a place to hide their activities behind labyrinthine corporate structures. It reached the point where Cyprus, with a population of little more than one million, became one of the main investors in Eastern and Central Europe.
Not all of these investors were criminal enterprises as many used Cyprus for tax optimisation purposes. But there is hardly a country in the region — from the former Yugoslavia to Russia and beyond — where Cyprus-based companies were not involved in huge, rigged privatisation scandals. In , when Cyprus joined the European Union EU and started opening databases, including a registry of locally based companies, things began to change.
Investigative reporters began combing through millions of records and, in many instances, came across the names of beneficial owners the real owners of the company — who thought they were sheltered from public scrutiny. Politicians and criminals were caught off guard and exposed in press articles that led to arrests and resignations. Their past misdemeanours made future involvement in business problematic. However, they started fighting back almost immediately, substituting their names in company documents with those of professional proxies — usually Cypriot lawyers who would lend their name to just about anyone who wanted to conceal their identity.
In addition to this, the Cyprus registry is relatively expensive to use and searchable only by company name. As a result, Cyprus still offers only partial transparency. Yet even in countries with a stronger record, you can hit barriers.
And in the past few years, OCCRP investigations have revealed the involvement of an Auckland-based company that was run by a nominee in obscuring the ownership of companies across Eastern Europe. Secretive media ownership is a huge problem across the region where, in many instances, the general public has no idea who is delivering the news. Once OCCRP exposed this non-transparent structure, its ownership was just moved to British companies that were again meant to obscure the identity of the real owners of the television station Media Ownership Project It matters because well-structured and accessible databases can be goldmines for investigators and members of the public.
This was the catalyst for investigative articles that exposed corrupt dictators, criminals and their close associates all over the world. This simple technical adjustment opened their activities up to public scrutiny, costing them untold millions of dollars. The same principle applies to other official databases. Things such as an Internal Affairs department, a strong leadership organization, and community support are just a few considerations in the… Constable Police corruption.
Corruption is an intractable problem 4 most interactive ways to remove the roots of corruption in India When I think about corruption, I think about me and you, I think about us and the society, and I also think about those corrupted persons, who are fighting for corrupting the corruption. Corruption is not a pebble that you can pick it… Bribery. Sports and Corruption Sport is a big phenomenon of today, it is very important part of today life.
It is also connected with dirty business, doping, corruption and violence on the… Bribery. Effects of corruption 1. Corruption has been a major problem in… Development. Role of a youth against corruption As a teenager Bala Balchandran argued with his father over why he did not want to become an IAS officer and why he wanted to go to the US to pursue a career in academics. Corruption in local government Corruption simply means dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those who are in power.
The Top 10 Corruption Topics Corruption remains common in everyday life, that is why people have become highly accustomed to this, more negative, aspect of life. Is it a modern phenomenon? What spheres of life have become the solid grounds of resorting to corruption? Corruption is sometimes referred to as a vicious circle. Do you think it is the circumstance of impossibility of its overcoming?
Nigeria is said to be one of the most corrupted countries in the world. Refer to the history of its political development and make your own presumption why this tendency does not decrease.
Some analytics suggest that the willing to rule and to be on the top of the corporal ladder are those factors that promote corruption and bribery. Do you concur with this statement? Imagine yourself fighting with corruption. How do you think the anti-corruption law has to be organized? What aspects of live are more vulnerable to briberies? Is corruption an intractable problem? What are the most interactive ways to remove the roots of this problem?
What are the effects of corruption? Is it just the deviation of general rules or decline in morality? Do you concur with an idea that corruption can be beaten if the new generation of the s comes to rule?
What is the role of youth against corruption? Does corruption eradicate all the problems that a person has to deal with? Corruption is everywhere and its biggest reason is low salary and wages. There are also many other reasons like culture, lack of accountability and regulation, culture etc.
These are the biggest reasons for corruption in Pakistan however there are many other reasons behind the corruption too. So check Corruption in Pakistan Top 10 Reasons which are listed below. Low salaries are the biggest and basic reason behind corruption. People are not satisfied with their salaries and they want to improve their lifestyle. So that is why they tend to take bribe to improve their living style and for that sake they do corruption in Pakistan.
Lack of Accountability and Regulation:
There is corruption in the police force, in law and order and even in the management of the Olympic Games. The infamous episode of match-fixing in cricket was also a case of corruption. Similar is the case with sportspersons caught using drugs. Corruption is caused mainly by the desires of power and want. Corruption creates a negative .
This essay will discuss how corruption in the Qing bureaucracy, the incompetent leadership, the closed mentality of the Qing Government, shortage of land and impact of an alien Manchu regime highlighted the Qing Government as .
Corruption Essay 2 ( words) Corruption is the misuse of public property, position, power and authority for fulfilling the selfish purposes to gain personal satisfactions. Corruption is the misuse of authority for personal gain of an individual or group. When writing an essay on corruption, you should carefully think about the effects of corruption on the country. Corruption seriously undermines democracy and the good name of political institutions. The economic, political, and social effects of corruption are hard to estimate.
Essay on Corruption in Pakistan Before moving towards to the main topic, you should know what is corruption? Corruption is a fraudulent conduct or dishonest by the persons who are in power which involves bribery or you can say that unethical conduct by a person to acquire personal benefits. Police Corruption Second Essay for AJ Krystal Lamas Victor Valley Community College Author Note This paper was prepared for AJ for Mr. Ronald M. Field.M.A. Abstract Police corruption is a complex issue.